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RULE-MAKING AND THE POLICEt 
Carl McGowan* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
THAT remarkable man, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, in whose name and by whose providence we are met on this occasion, had 
many profound perceptions about the nature of law-making. Except 
for the violence of the Civil War in his youth, his life was largely 
lived at a time and in a society which seem simple and benevolent by 
comparison with our own. Some of his generalizations, nevertheless, 
continue to define accurately the limitations under which we con-
front the complexities presently assailing us on every side. This is 
notably true of the administration of criminal justice. 
In the second of the landmark lectures in which Holmes explored 
the nature and development of the common law, he addressed him-
self to the jurisprudence of crimes, and his initial premise was stated 
in these terms: "The first requirement of a sound body of law is, that 
it should correspond with the actual feelings and demands of the 
community, right or wrong ... .'11 This derives from the broad prin-
ciple which emerged from Holmes's survey of the entire corpus of 
the common law, namely, that although judicial lawmaking in form 
purports to be logical, its substance is legislative in the sense of being 
compounded of "considerations of what is expedient for the com-
munity concemed."2 And these considerations, in tum, are "the 
unconscious result of instinctive preferences and inarticulate convic-
tions" which shape the dominant views of public policy at any one 
point in time.3 
It is undoubtedly true, as Holmes said, that no formulation of 
legal rules, in the criminal law or elsewhere, can be effective to the 
degree that it is at cross-purposes with the beliefs and expectations of 
the community. But one difficulty in applying this standard lies in 
the accurate identification of what the prevailing consensus of those 
beliefs and expectations is. It would be hard indeed, in the current 
clamor about law and order, to make that identification with any 
confidence or precision. Further, we as a people are not given to ac-
t The text is that of the Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise Lectures in the form in 
which they were delivered at The University of Michigan on November 15-16, 1971. 
• Member of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit. A.B. 1932, Dartmouth College; LL.B. 1936, Columbia University.-Ed. 
1. 0. Hou.ms, THE COMMON I.Aw 41 (1938). 
2. Id. at 36. 
3. Id. at 36. 
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cepting as sacrosanct and immutable a transient opinion-poll con-
sensus about any important public policy which we believe to be 
grounded in error and ignorance. We have always accorded to law 
an educative, as well as a regulatory, function; and, if the law can-
not lead, it cannot instruct. 
All three of the main segments of the administration of criminal 
justice today-law enforcement officers, judges, correctional officials 
-are caught in the focus of these tensions. They are exacerbated by 
a seemingly endless rise in the volume of crime, which creates under-
standable fears and stirs strong passions, and which overtaxes the 
resources currently allocated to its prevention and control. They are 
envenomed by our unexpiated heritage of racism and enflamed by 
our national fascination with violence. We are, in respect of crime, 
deep in a sea of troubles for which there are no instant or simplistic 
solutions. 
One who undertakes to talk about even a very narrow aspect of 
criminal justice perhaps owes it to his audience as well as himself to 
state the major reflections which his exposure to the criminal field 
has induced. That exposure, I hasten to say, has been solely that of 
an appellate judge, and has of necessity been a very restricted one. 
I have not been a victim of crime; and neither have I prosecuted or 
defended a typical criminal case or walked the beat with a police-
man. I do not even see the defendants whose appeals I hear. My 
range of vision is confined to the cold records of criminal trials. Al-
though I have seen what seems like an infinite number of them, my 
observation point is both fixed as to angle and remote in space and 
time from the actual happenings and from the people involved in 
them. 
These are very real limitations upon the validity of generalization 
in this area of the law. But, as Justice Holmes wrote to his friend Sir 
Frederick Pollock, " ... the chief end of man is to frame general 
propositions and ... no general proposition is worth a damn."4 It 
is in that spirit that the following reflections are laid before you, not 
as demonstrable truths but as perhaps illuminative of the point of 
departure for the central subject of these lectures. 
First, I find little evidence to suggest that what the courts do by 
way of doctrine bears any significant relationship to the level of 
crime.5 Especially is this true of the kinds of crime which are at the 
4. 2 HOLMES-POLLOCK I..ErrERS 59 (M. Howe ed. 1941). 
5. Dean Wigmore's view of the consequences of the exclusionary rule reflects a 
differing perception: "[T]he always watchful forces of criminality, fraud, anarchy and 
law evasion perceived the advantage and made vigorous use of it." 8 J. WIGMORE, 
EVIDENCE § 2184a n.l, at 31 (McNaughton rev. 1961). 
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center of our present concern. Had there never been a so-called War-
ren Court, it is hardly to be supposed that a dismaying growth in the 
volume of crime throughout the postwar years would thereby have 
been avoided. The typical criminal appellant before our court does 
not appear to determine his course of conduct by reference to judi-
cial decisions. It is fixed, rather, by racial discrimination, bad hous-
ing, ineffective education, underemployment, and all the related ills 
which characterize our unbalanced social structure. Crime will go 
down as these conditions are attacked at their roots. It will continue 
to go up as our efforts and our dollars are directed to other objectives. 
Second, it may be true to some extent that the level of crime is 
affected by the efficiency of the law enforcement process, including 
most notably the time it takes from arrest to final disposition. What-
ever may be the maximum potential of the criminal process for de-
terrence, it surely diminishes as delay makes that process unreal. 
Merely speeding up the functioning of the criminal courts is no 
single panacea for the prevention of crime, but there are values in 
doing so which comprehend, at least in some measure, the objectives 
of deterrence. We should strive to this end with all the imagination 
and ingenuity we have, ~ven though that effort should be made 
under no delusion that efficient courts offer anything like a total 
solution of the criminal problem. 
Third, there is insufficient grasp of the fact that crime is various 
in its manifestations, and does not lend itself easily to our ideal of 
uniform rules applying across the board. The member of the Mafia 
bears little resemblance to the nineteen-year old public school drop-
out, or to the black who cannot get a job because of his color. The 
political crimes, which have grown greatly in the wake of the dis-
satisfactions of privileged as well as underprivileged members of so-
ciety with various aspects of modem life, have little or nothing in 
common with the ordinary housebreaking or street mugging. The 
antitrust or securities fraud defendant, the colorless clerk of years of 
respectability who is suspected of murdering his wife, present prob-
lems quite unlike other defendants. The victimless offenses of alco-
holism, gambling, prostitution, and sexual aberration are a world 
unto themselves. 
Despite these differences, we try to design a criminal process of 
enforcement, adjudication, and correction which is uniform in its 
rules. And the ultimate standard for testing those rules is a Bill of 
Rights which, both in its terms and in its origins, was heavily pre-
occupied with the purely political oppressions which rebellious co-
lonials thought to see in their governance by the mother country. 
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It is, thus, no occasion for surprise that against this background, 
with its mixture of causes, proscriptions, and superstitions, it has 
been difficult to achieve Holmes's "first requirement of a sound body 
of law," namely, correspondence with the actual feelings and de-
mands of the community. We are many communities, not one; and 
we confront a bewildering variety of criminal activities, some of 
which arguably are not ·wisely to be dealt with at all in a criminal 
context. We are, in any event, massively involved with crime in this 
country today, and efforts to deal with it through the application of 
law are blunted to the extent that Holmes's "first requirement" is 
not met. My purpose in these lectures is to explore one means by 
which it is conceivable, although far from certain, that we could 
make some progress in that direction. 
A common and recurring complaint on too many sides is that the 
police, in their efforts to prevent and to detect crime, are shackled 
by restrictive and unrealistic judicial mandates. This view, not un-
naturally, is perhaps most widely held by the police themselves, but 
it is also shared by a large number of that community whose respect 
for legal formulations is essential to their efficacy. Not only laymen, 
but also many trained in the law, assert that the courts have verged 
too widely from their essential function of determining the guilt or 
innocence of the accused. 
In the process, so it is said, standards of law enforcement are im-
posed which subordinate this function to other objectives, related 
neither to the central mission of the courts nor to anything which, 
in the nature of things, they actually know much about. The result 
is that the law enforcers and the adjudicators are locked in angry 
controversy while the guilty assertedly thrive. A considerable body 
of public opinion, shaped by the justified fear of seeing our cities 
turned into lawless jungles, tends to regard the law, as laid down by 
the courts, to be out of joint. This generates demands for changes 
in it which are not necessarily in the public interest, and which 
would only impede or turn back our progress towards an increas-
ingly civilized social order. 
My last impression, gleaned from several years of reading trial 
records at the appellate stage, is that the police are at the very core 
of any purpose to achieve that progress. Neither the prosecutors, nor 
the courts, nor the correctional officials, can operate effectively if the 
police function is not of the highest professional character. More-
over, millions of people who never end up in the formal criminal 
process are closely affected in their daily lives by the quality of the 
police performance. There is, thus, every reason why the police 
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should move into the central focus of our effort to create a sound 
body of criminal law and to achieve both fairness and effectiveness 
in the administration of criminal justice. 
There is much that the police need. They have too long and too 
often been among the stepchildren of our society, denied the inter-
est and attention to which the importance of their work entitled 
them. Today, when they are increasingly critical to our very safety, 
we are reaping the harvest of long years of neglect. Those years were 
marked by vague disapproval of police work as a career in which a 
bright and ambitious young man should be interested. There was a 
monumental lack of concern with how they were being recruited 
and trained, and how much they were paid. We were quite content 
to think about them not at all until some crisis arose when we in-
sisted that they perform like supermen, after which we reverted to 
our former attitudes of massive disinterest and mild distaste. 
If the current preoccupations with rising crime rates do nothing 
else, surely they will generate a conviction that the state of the police, 
like the state of the medical arts, is the continuous business of every 
citizen. When we are ready to support and encourage as well as to 
criticize, then may we plausibly insist that the police operation be 
a highly professional one, guided by goals other than the single one 
of producing an arrestee for every crime logged on the station house 
books. 
II. EXTERNAL PRESCRIPTION AND INDIRECT SANCTION 
The subject of this discourse is the role of the police in criminal 
rule-making. This has reference, of course, not to the rules of the 
substantive criminal law, but to the procedural rules of law enforce-
ment operations.6 This subject, though narrow in terms, is insepara-
ble from the central question which has immemorially challenged 
the criminal law and which has become acute in the present climate 
of rising crime. That overriding issue is, of course, the problem of 
how to enforce the criminal law effectively without sacrificing the 
rights and freedoms of the individual.7 
6. Although our theory of government leaves the making of the substantive criminal 
law exclusively to the legislature, the police do in fact have a very real, though essen-
tially negative, role in fashioning our substantive criminal law through their power 
of selective and discretionary law enforcement. For an excellent analysis of the problems 
and parameters of the discretionary enforcement of the criminal law, see K. DAVIS, 
DISCRETIONARY JusnCE 80-96 (1969). What Professor Davis laments about selective law 
enforcement is not so much its existence as its invisibility, and it is in this context that 
he most vigorously urges the formulation and publication of rules by the police. 
7. The concept of a constant dialectic tension in our system of criminal justice 
between the objectives of efficient law enforcement and the maximization of due process 
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The current tension between the law as stated by the courts and 
what the public finds acceptable is perhaps not due so much to pop• 
ular disagreement with the importance of individual rights. It may 
rather be a consequence of the failure by many people, including 
judges, to appreciate fully the critical significance of the police to 
any practical resolution of the matter. Heretofore it would seem that 
our methods of providing civil protections have, contrarily, dis-
counted that significance, as witness the fact that rules designed to 
protect the individual from police misconduct have typically origi-
nated in other quarters than the police. 
There is a new and growing interest, however, in shifting the 
formulation of rules in the first instance to the police themselves.8 
And there are some isolated signs of a readiness on the part of the 
police to undertake this step in the direction of self-regulation. If 
this proves to be more than a fleeting phenomenon, it could be quite 
meaningful for the entire structure of criminal justice, including 
not only greater fairness in its administration but also a healthier 
climate of public respect for the manner in which the system works. 
Perhaps I can best give the matter concrete and meaningful con-
tours by relating an experience we have recently had on our court. 
We have been plagued, as have all courts with criminal jurisdiction, 
with the problem of identification evidence. In a dismayingly high 
percentage of the criminal appeals which come to us, the prosecu-
tion's case rests solely on identification testimony. This is not said 
critically of police or prosecutor, because the fact is that, in many of 
the criminal episodes which are causing the greatest public concern 
today, there is no way to proceed except by the route of identifica-
tion. The yoking on the street is rarely observed by anyone but the 
victim, the fleeing of the scene is usually accomplished successfully 
by the bandit, and, if the malefactor is eventually caught, the stolen 
ten-dollar bill is no longer in his possession. The police have no way 
to begin their investigation except by exhibiting to the victim pho-
liberties has become an established analytical framework for most scholars in this field. 
See Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1964). 
8. See, e.g., ABA PROJECl' ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JusnCE, STANDARDS 
RELATING TO THE POLICE FUNC11ON (Tentative Draft, Oct. 1971); K. DAVIS, supra note 6, 
at 80-96; NATIONAL ADVISORY CoMlllN, ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT 164-65 (1968); PRESI• 
DENT'S CoM:MN. ON LA.W ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JusnCE, THE CHALLENGE 
OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 103-06 (1967); Id., TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 13~1 
(1967); Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal Cases, 
45 N.Y.U. L. R.Ev. 785, 810 (1970); Caplan, The Police Legal Advisor, 58 J. CRIM, L.C. &: 
P.S. 303 (1967); Goldstein, Police Policy Formulation: A. Proposal for Improving Police 
Performance, 65 MICH. L. REv. 1123 (1967). 
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tographs in their files which might conceivably include the guilty 
person. 
If the victim picks out a photograph from those shown to him, 
the subject of the photograph is arrested and charged. If trial is to 
proceed under these circumstances alone, the case consists of an in-
court identification of the defendant by the victim, supported by the 
latter's testimony as to his opportunity to observe at the time of the 
commission of the crime and of his subsequent selection of the de-
fendant's photograph from the array presented to him. The weak-
nesses of identification testimony need not be recounted, since each 
of us knows from his own experience in a noncriminal context how 
difficult it is to be certain that the person we have seen only fleet-
ingly is the one we encounter later. Juries tend to be unimpressed 
with this kind of evidence, and the acquittal rate is not inconsider-
able in cases where it alone constitutes the government's case. 
An additional element of certainty can be added, however, by 
testimony that the eyewitness has picked the defendant out of a for-
mal lineup. That represents no assurance of guilt, but, in a situation 
traditionally fraught with the perils of mistake, it is the best that can 
be done, especially since the Supreme Court has added the presence 
of counsel for the suspect to the protections under which the suspect 
appears in a formal lineup.9 The Court has not as yet held that a 
lineup must be held in every case; it has said only that, if a lineup 
is held, the defendant must have had counsel present if evidence of 
the resulting identification is to be received. 
In the case of which I speak, the eyewitnesses did, following the 
crime, select the defendant's photograph from among two separate 
sets shown to them, first immediately after the crime, and again the 
day before trial. No formal lineup was ever held, even though there 
was ample time for doing so. The defendant urged upon us that the 
failure to hold a lineup should, without more, invalidate his convic-
tion as a matter of constitutional due process. An alternative theory 
pressed was that, under the circumstances here involved, the show-
ing of the photographs on the eve of trial became a critical stage of 
the prosecution which required the presence of defendant's counsel. 
What is interesting and perhaps unique about this case is that an 
adoption of either of the defendant's theories would follow upon the 
promulgation by the police department in question of a rule that, 
despite the identification of the defendant by means of a photo-
9. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). See also United States v. Simmons, 
390 U.S. 377 (1968); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967). 
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graphic exhibition immediately after the crime, the arresting officer 
acting on this identification must promptly make arrangements for 
a formal lineup. 
This rule had not been issued until after the events had taken 
place in the case before us, but it appears to be both a laudable and 
a sensible effort by the police not only to protect the innocent but 
to strengthen the case against the guilty. Its recognition could be 
characterized as not a self-conceived prescription by the judiciary but 
a reinforcement of a self-denying ordinance voluntarily imposed by 
.the police on themselves. No judicial decision required them to do 
it. It was simply a step taken in the exercise of good judgment as to 
how a police department should function in the public interest, 
which comprehends both an interest in fairness to the accused and 
in convicting the guilty. 
Justice Holmes would, I suggest, regard this police rule as a pal-
pable contribution to the achievement of his "first requirement" of 
a sound body of law. His only question might be whether eviden-
tiary exclusion should play any role at all under these circumstances, 
assuming that the police rule is not likely to be withdrawn and that 
the police command will rigorously enforce it by appropriate dis-
ciplinary action against members of the force who disregard it. 
In any event, the issuance of this rule has been a heartening de-
velopment. It might well not have happened if the police chief had 
not acted some time ago to create a General Counsel and accompany-
ing legal staff serving only the Police Department. The rule in ques-
tion was drafted by this unit, and it represents a la'wyer-like response 
to an operational problem, formulated after that problem has been 
examined in all its aspects, including the practical feasibility of the 
prescribed rule of conduct. This is the way la'wyers do, and are ex-
pected to, function in relation to the affairs of private clients; and 
the needs of the police in this respect are no less pressing. I have said 
heretofore that 
[i]magination and innovation, soundly conceived in relation to spe-
cific problems, need not be the exclusive stock-in-trade of defense 
counsel or reform-minded legislatures and courts. The police in par-
ticular are entitled to the same kind of creative, probing, wide-rang-
ing legal thinking which is not content to concede that, because things 
have always been done a certain way in the past, they must continue 
to be done in the same way in the future or they cannot be done at 
all.lo 
10. McGowan, Constitutional Interpretation and Criminal Identification, 12 WM, 
8: MARYL. REv. 235,248 (1970), 
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I earnestly hope that we are on the verge of a widening availabil-
ity to police departments of independent legal counselling by law-
yers who are not only thoroughly familiar with police operations but 
who at the same time are sensitive to the claims of an ordered sys-
tem of liberty. It has sometimes seemed to me that if only a fraction 
of the talent and ingenuity available to the defense through court-
appointed counsel could be directed towards advising the police in 
the first instance, then, given a police leadership of similar breadth, 
the problems of the administration of criminal justice generally, and 
of the courts in particular, would be greatly mitigated. It is clear 
that such legal resources must be forthcoming for the police if they 
are to be accorded a larger role in the formulation of rules govern-
ing their own conduct. 
Up to this point in time, of course, that role has been minor to 
the point of nonexistence. Everybody, it sometimes seems, makes 
rules for the police but the police themselves. Certainly it is true 
that, to the extent police conduct in enforcing the criminal law is 
subject to explicit prescriptions, these have emanated from sources 
external to the police, notably courts and legislatures. This can 
doubtless be attributed to a number of factors, e.g., the traditionally 
low estate of the police, both in the public eye and their own, the 
undercommitment of resources to them, the practice of relying on 
the prosecutor's office for legal advice. Notably absent has been any 
tradition of the police department as a vital and independent execu-
tive agency. 
Except in the more rural and less populous parts of the country, 
this tradition is changing. The head of the police department of a 
major city today is a prominent figure in the governmental scene, 
frequently nationally as well as locally, and his force is a large and 
highly organized entity. The departments have begun to look and 
act more like other large governmental agencies under the discipline 
of embodying their principles of action in visible rules. For the pres-
ent, however, they are largely the recipients of rules from the out-
side. 
Those that come from the courts are in two forms. One consists 
of rules formulated as such under judicial rule-making powers and 
independently of judicial decisions in particular criminal cases. A 
classic example of this form is to be found in what are known as the 
Judges' Rules in England.11 These were initially issued in 1912 by 
the members of the King's Bench Division of the High Court of 
11. [1964] CRIM. L. R.Ev. 166-70 (Appendix A). 
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Justice in response, it is of interest to note, to the request of the 
police, who wished judicial guidance as to how to proceed in the 
interrogation of suspects.12 The Rules, nine in number, deal only 
with this subject. They provide in essence for a warning to the 
suspect of his right to silence, a requirement that statements made 
be reduced to writing, and a prohibition upon cross-examining or 
hectoring the suspect for information not freely volunteered. The 
warning curiously enough need not be given until the interrogator 
has heard enough to cause him to charge the suspect with a crime.13 
There is no reference in the Judges' Rules to the right to counsel, 
although it is said that a suspect may, if he is sufficiently alert, con-
dition his willingness to talk upon the presence of anyone he wishes,14 
In this country a notable example of a nondecisional judicial rule 
directed expressly to the police is Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. It requires the police to take an arrested suspect 
before a magistrate without "unnecessary delay." In the cases of 
McNabb v. United States15 and Mallory v. United States,16 the Su-
preme Court put teeth into Rule 5(a) by ruling that evidence seized 
in violation of it-that is, during periods of unnecessary delay before 
presentment-cannot be admitted at trial. 
The McNabb-Mallory rule has given rise to much litigation and 
great public controversy, culminating in the enactment by Congress 
in 1968 of a statute which forbids the exclusion of evidence on the 
ground of delay in presentment so long as such presentment occurs 
within six hours of arrest, or even longer if the occasion for the 
further delay is reasonable under the circumstances.17 The statute 
appears to have had markedly little impact, presumably because of 
uncertainty as to whether the Supreme Court views the McNabb-
Mallory exclusionary rule as having, over and above the supervisory 
power, a base in the fifth amendment.18 
12. P. DEVLIN, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN ENGLAND 39-40 (1958). 
13. Id. at 34. Compare Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), and Miranda v, 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
14. P. DEVLIN, supra note 12, at 41-42. 
15. 318 U.S. 332 (1943). 
16. 354 U.S. 449 (1957). 
17. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, § 350l(c), 18 U.S.C. § 850l(c) 
(1970). 
18. The Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the statute, and cases decided before 
the statute was enacted leave in doubt the question whether the McNabb-Mallory rule 
is grounded in the fifth amendment. Compare Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 
486 n.12 (1963), with Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 463 (1966). A number of lower 
court opinions have assumed sub silentio the continuing validity and viability of 
McNabb-Mallory. See Williams v. United States, 419 F.2d 740 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Frazier 
v. United States, 419 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Others have assumed the validity of 
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The second form taken by judicially imposed controls on police 
conduct is that of the application in individual cases of a rule exclud-
ing evidence acquired in violation of constitutional commands. It 
had its inception in the federal courts as long ago as 1914 when the 
Supreme Court in Weeks v. United States19 purported to exercise its 
supervisory powers to exclude evidence stemming from an unreason-
able search and seizure proscribed by the fourth amendment. 
The state courts were not disposed to emulate this practice, for 
reasons of policy pithily summarized by Chief Judge Cardozo of the 
New York Court of Appeals when he said of the exclusionary rule: 
"There has been no blinking the consequences. The criminal is to go 
free because the constable has blundered."20 This divergence between 
the two judicial systems was ended, however, in 1961 when the 
Supreme Court included the exclusionary rule in its earlier extension 
of the fourth amendment search and seizure limitations to the states.21 
In the ensuing decade that process has proceeded apace, with the 
result that the exclusionary rule now, in both state and federal 
tribunals, stands in the way of evidence tainted by fifth and sixth 
amendment violations as well.22 
These developments have, in effect, generated many limitations 
upon police conduct, and they constitute, in substance and effect, a 
body of rules for the regulation of police operations.23 Whatever their 
§ 350l(c). See Grooms v. United States, 429 F.2d 839, 843 (8th Cir. 1970); United States 
v. Halbert, 436 F.2d 1226, 1231-37 (9th Cir. 1970). 
19. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
20. People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926). 
21. Mapp. v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), overruling Wolf v •. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 
(1949). 
22. See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. 436 (1966). 
23. The scope of this corpus of exclusionary rules is broad and its contours some-
times esoteric. The general rule of exclusion of illegally seized evidence, Mapp v. Ohio, 
367 U.S. 643 (1961), is subject to the limitations of state action, Burdeau v. McDowell, 
256 U.S. 465 (1921) (evidence illegally seized by private persons not excludable), and 
the shifting contours of standing to object. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 4l(e); Simmons v. United 
States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960). The exclusionary 
rules extend to exclude the fruits of evidence illegally seized. Silverthorne Lumber Co. 
v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920). See also Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969); 
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 
338 (1939). In some cases, however, the causal connection between the fruits and the 
primary illegality may "become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint." Nardone v. 
United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939). In other cases, evidence which is not strictly 
speaking the result of the primary illegality is nevertheless excluded if it was "impelled" 
by it. Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219 (1968). The exclusionary rules compel the 
exclusion of evidence from the government's direct case but permit the evidence for 
impeaching the defendant's credibility, at least on matters collateral to the central 
issue of the case. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971); Walder v. United States, 347 
U.S. 62 (1954). Finally, the exclusionary rules are generally limited to prospective 
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intrinsic merit, they do distinguish our criminal jurisprudence 
sharply from that of most other countries. In England the Judges' 
Rules are looked upon as admonitions intended to be helpful, and 
not as mandatory rules for which sanctions will invariably be brought 
to bear by the courts in the event of breach. English trial judges do 
possess the power to exclude evidence obtained in violation of the 
Judges' Rules, but it is a discretionary power infrequently exercised.24 
In other areas not involving the interrogation of suspects, the police 
are free to proceed as they see fit, except in the case of wire-tapping 
where a warrant must first be obtained from an executive official, 
the Home Secretary.25 A reason usually advanced for this wide 
latitude afforded the police in England is that they have traditionally 
acted according to self-imposed standards of restraint and fair play 
which make close external supervision unnecessary.26 
In Canada improperly acquired evidence is admissible at trial, 
and this even includes induced confessions to the extent that other 
evidence (including fruits of the confession) is confirmatory of the 
confession.27 Israel takes the same approach,28 and Japan has no limi-
tations on admissibility, even in the case of confessions.20 Some coun-
tries, while placing no limitations on the admissibility of other 
evidence, severely restrict the use of confessions. India, by statute, 
requires them to be made in the presence of a magistrate;30 and 
Germany excludes them altogether if the defendant elects to testify 
in his own defense.31 Scotland prohibits all interrogation after arrest 
application only. See Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969), and cases cited 
therein. 
24. See Developments in the Law-Confessions, 79 HARV. L. R.Ev. 935, 1094 (1966). 
As in this country, the English have long excluded demonstrably involuntary confessions 
as a matter not in the trial judge's discretion but as a matter of the defendant's right, 
The ground for exclusion is not deterrence or prophylaxis, nor even the privilege against 
self-incrimination, but the inherent unreliability of confessions not voluntarily given, 
See P. DEVLIN, supra note 12, at 38. 
25. P. DEVLIN, supra note 12, at 66. 
26. Id. at 64. How much the police comply with the Judges' Rules is a matter of 
some debate. Lord Devlin maintains that, even without a substantial threat of exclu-
sion, police officers are sensitive to judicial admonitions and criticism. Id. at 27, Others 
maintain that the rules are so frequently ignored that they cannot be regarded as an 
effective restraint upon the police. See J. SKOLNIK, JUSTICE WITHour TRIAL 66-67 (1966): 
authorities cited in 1 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRAcnCE AND PROCEDURE § 72 n.20, at 64 
(1969); Developments, supra note 24, at 1095. 
27. Symposium, The Exclusionary Rule Under Foreign Law, 52 J. CR1111. L.C. &: P.S, 
271 (1961). 
28. Id. at 282. 
29: Id. at 284. 
30. Indian Evidence Act, 4 India Code pt. II (1956). See generally Developments, 
supra note 24, at 1106. 
31. Symposium, supra note 27, at 277. 
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and excludes all statements (and the fruits thereof) taken in violation 
of this restriction.82 Thus, as was the case in pre-Mapp days in this 
country, there are variations abroad in the choices made between the 
evidentiary policies of admitting evidence which is reliable in its 
indication of guilt, on the one hand, and, on the other, excluding 
such evidence as a sanction to deter the future repetition of the con-
duct by which it was unearthed. 
Apart from rules of judicial origin, police conduct is also the 
subject of legislative regulation. When the Mallory case, which came 
up from the District of Columbia, was decided by the Supreme Court 
by reference to Rule 5(a) of the Court's Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
a District of Columbia Code requirement of prompt presentment 
virtually identical with that required by the Rule had been on the 
statute books for many years.88 Rule 5(a) was itself an embodiment of 
earlier federal code provisions to the same effect.84 Most states have 
similar provisions, although in some the statute undertakes to define 
the permissible limits of delay.s5 There are also many state statutes 
prescribing the conditions under which arrests can be made with 
and without warrants, and prohibiting certain forms of pressure in 
the interrogation of suspects.s6 
The most comprehensive effort yet launched to write a legislative 
prescription for police conduct during the period prior to present-
ment in court is the American Law Institute's current project for a 
Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure. As yet incomplete, drafts 
have been prepared which cover virtually every aspect of this critical 
period in the relations between police and suspect. Part I deals with 
such subjects as the investigative stop and questioning, arrests with-
out warrant, and detention and interrogation prior to presentment.s7 
Part II grapples with the intensely difficult subject of searches and 
seizures.ss Not yet available even in draft are contemplated provisions 
32. In Scotland, reputedly it is even bad form for the police not to advise a suspect 
not to say anything. See Manuel v. H.M.A., [1958] Just. Cas. 41, 49 (Scot.); Hardin, 
Other Answers: Search and Seizure, Coerced Confessions, and Criminal Trial in Scotland, 
113 U. PA. L. REv. 165, 173 (1964). 
33. 4 D.C, CODE ANN. § 140 (1967) (R.S. C.D. § 397, Act of July 16, 1862, repealed 
July 29, 1970, Pub. L No. 91-358, § 20l(b)(l), tit. II, 84 Stat. 653). 
34. Act of Aug. 18, 1894, ch. 301, 28 Stat. 415 (repealed by Act of June 25, 1948, 
ch. 646, § 39, 62 Stat. 992); Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 595, 48 Stat. 1008 (repealed by Act 
of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 21, 62 Stat. 862). 
35. See statutes collected in ALI, A MODEL CODE OF PRE-AllRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE, 
Tentative Draft No. 1, Appendix IV (1966) [hereinafter ALI CoDE]. 
36. See statutes collected in ALI CODE, supra note 35, Tentative Draft No. 1, 
Appendix V. 
37. ALI CODE, supra note 35, Tentative Draft No. 1. 
38. ALI CoDE, supra note 35, Tentative Drafts Nos. 3 &: 4 (1971). 
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for direct penalties for violations of the Code's substantive provisions 
-a subject pregnant with significance for the future of the indirect 
sanction of the exclusionary rule.89 Thus far, the drafts have made a 
place for the exclusionary sanction, but under conditions of flexibility 
in application which have been largely absent from court decisions.40 
In its tentative and unfinished form, there can be no final and 
informed judgment as yet as to how successful this effort will be to 
provide a satisfactory and acceptable regimen for a legislature to 
prescribe for the police. There are obvious advantages in the legis-
lative approach ove:r the judicial. Decisional rule-making can occur 
only in the sporadic context of individual cases. The Code approach 
permits the whole area to be surveyed at once, with the result that 
the provisions made for various parts of the process can be related to, 
and made consistent with, each other. And, before the Code becomes 
law in any state, it will have to run the gamut of public legislative 
hearings in which all interested and informed persons can be heard, 
as contrasted with the immediate parties to a criminal prosecution. 
The making of rules externally for police conduct suffers from 
two principal limitations. One is the absence of direct police involve-
ment in the process. The other is the question of appropriate sanc-
tions to assure their enforcement. The two obviously interact upon 
each other. It is a psychological truism that self-regulation tends to 
command a higher degree of observance by the regulated, if for no 
other reason than that the reasonableness of the resulting command 
is more self-evident. The police may be something of a special prob-
lem in this regard, but they are not exempt from the impulses and 
motivations which shape human conduct generally. Increased respon-
sibility to order one's mm conduct normally evokes a heightened 
39. ALI CODE, supra note 35, Proposed Tentative Draft No. I, art. 10; Proposed 
Tentative Draft No. 3, art. 9. 
40. The provisions of Tentative Draft No. 1, art. 9, for example, apply to exclude 
statements and their evidentiary fruits obtained in violation of Part I of the Code. 
Unlike the exclusionary rule as it now exists, however, provisions exist for the "cure" of 
certain violations. See § 9.03. Other minor violations do not lead to the exclusion of 
statements which are made in the presence of counsel. See §§ 9.01-.07. Under § 9.09 
fruits of illegally obtained statements are inadmissible "unless the court finds that 
exclusion of such evidence is not necessary to deter violations of [the] Code." Finally, 
§ 9.10 provides that violations which are "excusable under the circumstances" do not 
lead to exclusion. 
The sanctions of Tentative Draft No. 4, § 8.02 apply to exclude evidence obtained 
in violation of the search and seizure provisions of Part II of the Code, but operate 
only if the court finds the violation to be "substantial" (§ 8.02(2)); or in the case of 
fruits, if the court does not find that "such evidence would probably have been 
discovered by law enforcement authorities irrespective of such search or seizure, and 
••• that exclusion of such evidence is not necessary to deter violations of [the] Code," 
(§ 8.02(3)). 
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sense of obligation in performance. The police, organized in a semi-
military tradition, work in that tradition's responsiveness to going 
by the book, which is always less grudging if one has had a role in 
·writing the book. The physical structure of the police is also directed 
towards discipline for failure to follow explicit commands from 
above. 
In the matter of sanctions, it is important to note that the mode 
of enforcement of external rules has been almost entirely indirect in 
its incidence. The erring policeman rarely has had visited upon him-
self any penalty for his infraction. He may, indeed, never even know 
that, at a trial held many months after an arrest, his handling of the 
matter has led to a reversal or an acquittal. This is because the only 
sanction of any significance for the breaking of the external rules 
has, up to this point at any rate, been the exclusion of evidence 
obtained in an improper manner. 
The ever-widening reach of the exclusionary rule has not been 
paralleled by growing confidence in its effectiveness in achieving one 
of its nvo professed purposes, namely, the deterrence for the future of 
police methods which the courts have put beyond the pale.41 Pro-
fessor Oaks, the author of the most intensive survey of this effective-
ness, ends essentially with the conclusion that the evidence does not 
admit of an acceptable conclusion one way or the other. He describes 
his own state of mind as tending towards the replacement of the rule, 
although he is not prepared to urge that step just yet.42 
The Chief Justice of the United States, in an opinion earlier this 
year, pronounced himself to be of a similar view.43 Justice Harlan, 
in one of his last expressions while on the Court, unequivocally 
recommended the overruling of Mapp in order to lift the constitu-
tional burden of the exclusionary rule from the backs of the state 
courts.44 What the future portends for the rule is cloudy, but, as 
the Supreme Court finds itself in one of its great cycles of change 
in terms of its personnel, it would be rash to assert that the rule, at 
least as a constitutional command, is not in jeopardy. 
41. The literature on the exclusionary rule is extensive. For a bibliography of some 
of the writings critical of the rule, see the appendix to Chief Justice Burger's dissent 
in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 426-27 (1971). For a summary 
of the principal arguments against the rule, see Paulsen, The Exclusionary Rule and 
Misconduct by the Police, 52 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 255 (1961). 
42. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Cm. L. R.Ev. 
665 (1970). 
43. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 411 (1971) (Burger, J., 
dissenting). See also Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchman?, 14 AM. U. L. REV. 1 
(1964). 
44. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 490, 491 (1971) (concurring opinion). 
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This is so, it may be said, because, bereft of demonstrable proof 
that the rule in fact accomplishes its purpose to deter, it rests uneasily, 
at least in popular estimation, upon its other foundation of an 
imperative of judicial integrity. In articulating that concept, the 
Court has in substance said that, even if the exclusion of otherwise 
reliable evidence of guilt cannot deter improper police conduct, the 
judiciary cannot knowingly countenance or reward it.4G There is a 
serious question, however, as to whether this legal principle com-
mands sufficient popular acquiescence to make it viable for any sus-
tained period of time, especially in an era of public anxiety about 
rising levels of crime. The layman finds it difficult to grasp, and 
many lawyers think the highest integrity of the adjudicative aspect of 
the criminal process lies in the separation of the guilty from the 
innocent on the basis of all the relevant evidence available.40 
In the present climate, therefore, one does not have to declare 
himself uncompromisingly for or against the exclusionary rule to 
justify an inquiry into feasible alternatives. Its most devoted ad-
herents may find themselves whistling in the dark in failing to do so. 
My own inclination is to think that the exclusionary rule has had 
important consequences in terms of the elevation of police standards 
of conduct and that, even if the rule were to be abolished tomorrow, 
we would, because of it, be left on a markedly higher plateau of police 
performance with respect to the treatment of suspects. 
It is this supposition that emboldens me to think that one alter-
native worth exploring is greater participation by the police in the 
making of rules for their own guidance, and greater reliance con-
comitantly upon the police for the internal enforcement of such rules. 
To the extent that this could prove to be not merely an idle fancy, it 
embraces the prospect not only of progressively higher elevations in 
the quality of police performance, but also of relieving the courts of 
the necessity of seeming to obscure the search for truth by rejecting 
reliable evidence. 
Some may think it quixotic even to speculate about an improve-
ment in police performance and attitude, at least in the foreseeable 
future, commensurate with this possibility; and they may perhaps 
be right. There are, nevertheless, some omens of a new era. In New 
45. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659-60 (1961). 
46. Indeed, how firmly the exclusionary rule is grounded on the principle of judicial 
integrity, even in the view of the Supreme Court, is open to question. The fact that 
most of the rules have been given only prospective application suggests at least a 
primary emphasis on deterrence. See, e.g., Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969); 
Link.letter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965). See also notes 83-89 infra and accompanying 
text. 
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York City, Commissioner Murphy recently met with a group of five 
law professors and offered them full access to the Department's 
records for purposes of scholarly research.47 For what has traditionally 
been a closed society, this is an almost unbelievable development. 
The drive on corruption within the force mounted by Commissioner 
Murphy bodes well for the internal enforcement of other rules. The 
District of Columbia is another place where the advent of forward-
looking leadership has altered the familiar image, and gives promise 
of a new style of operation for the future. 
There may be other such examples of the winds of change blow-
ing in such unlikely quarters as the police, as I am sure there are 
plenty of places where the old attitudes and the old ways of doing 
things show no signs of crumbling. But it would be unfortunate if 
the idea of police rule-making were dismissed as so much wishful 
thinking, on the grounds that the police can be trusted neither to 
make good rules nor to enforce them if made. Police officials have 
on occasion demonstrated less than professional qualities, but they 
are not unique in that respect. And, given the emotion-charged and 
isolated conditions in which individual policemen operate, one 
should not minimize the difficulties of enforcing rules in a major 
police department. 
It is because the difficulties are so great, and because the police 
are so central to the chances for improving our system of criminal 
justice, that we need able men in positions of leadership in our police 
departments-men who are sensitive to the need for reconciling 
effective law enforcement with the protection of suspects' rights. It 
is true that without such men the outlook for the success of police 
rule-making is obscured. But it is also true that if proposals such as 
police rule-making must be dismissed out of hand because there are 
no such men presently in our police departments or willing to serve, 
then we are very badly off-so much so, indeed, that a handful of 
judges, attempting to control police behavior indirectly and hap-
hazardly, face a formidable undertaking. 
In any event, there is no suggestion under the police rule-making 
approach that the courts either could or should abdicate their ulti-
mate responsibilities to protect the privacy and to safeguard the 
liberty of the individual. The last word as to the propriety of police-
made rules always remains with the judicial branch; and that protects 
the integrity of the judicial process against frustration by police 
failures. 
47. N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1971, at 47, col. 1. 
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In the last analysis, of course, the case for police rule-making does 
not rest solely upon the prospects for improvement in police per-
formance. Indeed, the poorer the performance, the greater the need 
for rules, since the worst of all worlds is a benighted department 
exercising the maximum discretion under invisible standards. There 
will be many false starts in the making by the police of their own 
rules, and the initial invalidation rate on judicial review may be high. 
The important thing is that there be movement towards a system in 
which the police are obliged to embody their operational policy 
determinations in formal rules for all to see. That way lies a chance 
to achieve both greater freedom from oppression for the individual 
and greater security for society. 
III. THE POTENTIAL OF SELF-REGULATION 
The timeliness of an exploration of greater participation by the 
police in the formulation of rules for their own conduct derives from 
a number of considerations. One is the growing disenchantment, 
shared by some of the most sympathetic observers, with the effective-
ness of externally originated rules to achieve their purposes. This is 
especially true of rules of judicial origin, which are conceived in the 
context of specific cases reaching the courts for adjudication. No less 
a friend of individual rights than Professor Anthony Amsterdam has 
recently recognized the limited reach in practical terms of even the 
landmark decisions of the Supreme Court relating to fair and equi-
table criminal procedures.48 
The judges obviously have greater capabilities to elevate the 
criminal process from and after the point at which judicial authority 
attaches; and they have scored impressive successes in that regard. 
It is the projection of that authority to earlier stages, including police-
citizen confrontations in circumstances never eventuating in formal 
prosecutions, that is in trouble. 
Professor Kenneth Davis, in his justified concern about the wide 
area of justice committed to the discretion of public officials, per-
suasively points to the police as a compelling example of this for-
bidding phenomenon.49 He argues eloquently for analogizing the 
police function to that of other agencies which are avowedly making 
and implementing policies having a major impact upon the public. 
It is his submission that the police should, accordingly, be required 
48. Amsterdam, supra note 8. 
49. K. DAVIS, supra note 6, at 81-96. 
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to emulate such agencies by articulating their policies in visible 
form. He would extend the full panoply of the administrative process, 
including formal rule-making and judicial review, to police policy 
formulation. 
There are a number of respects in which the utilization by the 
police of formal rule-making procedures might secure the advantages 
normally characterizing the administrative process. One is the provi-
sion of flexibility. Professor Herbert Packer has commented on the 
rigidity which inheres in the conditions under which courts make 
rules in the first instance: 
Nobody else is exerting control over the law enforcement process, so 
the justices think that they must. But they can do so, in state cases 
at any rate, only in the discharge of their duty to construe the Con-
stitution in cases that come before them. And so, the rules of the 
criminal process, which ought to be the subject of flexible inquiry 
and adjustment by law-making bodies having the institutional ca-
pacity to deal ·with them, are evolved through a process that its warm-
est defenders recognize as to some extent awkward and inept: the 
rules become "constitutionalized.''t1o 
Rule-making cannot, of course, give the police the flexibility to 
violate constitutional commands. But the Supreme Court itself has 
recognized the proposition stated by Professor Alfred Hill, namely, 
that "[e]ven when, in the apparent absence of alternatives, a pro-
cedural rule is held to be constitutionally required, it may cease to be 
so if suitable alternatives are developed, or if other measures have 
eliminated or brought under control the evil at which it is aimed.''51 
The Court, in holding that the sixth amendment required the 
presence of counsel for the suspect when he was being viewed in a 
lineup, went on to say that such a requirement might not be impera-
tive if, by "[l]egislative or other regulations, such as those of local 
police departments," the risks of undue suggestibility are elimi-
nated.52 
Thus, even under the shadow of constitutional commands, there 
is room for experimentation in law enforcement methods; and the 
administrative agency model is a demonstrably effective means of 
pursuing such a pragmatic course. The Task Force Report on the 
Police of the President's Commission on Crime has identified the 
58. Packer, The Courts, the Police, and the Rest of Us, 57 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 238, 
240 (1966). 
51. Hill, The Bill of Rights and the Supervisory Power, 69 CoLUi.r. L. R.Ev. 181 (1969). 
52. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 239 (1967). 
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advantage of flexibility as one to be gained through "the mature 
participation of the police, as a responsible administrative agency, in 
the development and implementation of law enforcement policies."li3 
A second advantage inherent in the administrative process, which 
might be obtained in the law enforcement context, is the application 
of expertise on a continuous and systematic basis. Courts, when for-
mulating rules in the first instance, are not endowed with this 
specialized knowledge and experience. Their interventions are neces-
sarily of a random nature, shaped by reference only to the facts of the 
individual cases which reach them for adjudication. La·wyers striving 
for victory in adversary litigation cannot be expected invariably to 
put "the individual case in the context of the overall enforcement 
policy involved."54 The judges, accordingly, may not grasp fully the 
wider implications and consequences of the rules they promulgate 
within the four comers of the isolated record before them. 
Perhaps this concept can be given concreteness by reference to a 
recent experience of my court which demonstrates the vacuum in 
which judges are currently called upon to act. In an appeal from a 
conviction for a federal narcotics offense, the case for the government 
rested upon the admissibility in evidence of heroin capsules found 
upon the person of the defendant after he had been arrested late at 
night for a violation of the motor vehicle laws,lili Precisely what the 
officer did or saw when he took custody of the defendant as the latter 
emerged from his car was unclear from the record. 
The prosecution was prepared to assume on appeal, however, that 
there had been a full-scale search of the person; and it pressed us to 
embrace a general rule that the police may properly do this in the 
case of any lawful arrest, even though the crime for which the arrest 
is made is complete and there is no occasion to search for evidence 
of it. The policy justification advanced was that such a rule is essen-
tial to the personal safety of the arresting officer. It was said that, 
under circumstances in which the officer must maintain custody until 
the arrestee is delivered to the station house, and in the light of the 
realities of modem weaponry, a mere frisk is not sufficient. 
These representations were made solely by the prosecutor. The 
police command itself had formulated no formal rule to this effect 
for observance by their men, and there was not before us any indica-
tion as to whether, or why, the police authorities felt such a rule to be 
53. TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE, supra note 8, at 19. 
54. LaFave & Remington, Controlling the Police: The Judge's Role in Malting and 
Reviewing Law Enforcement Decisions, 63 MICH. L. REv. 987, 1006 (1965). 
55. United States v. Robinson, 447 F.2d 1215 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
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necessary. We had no way of knowing if the police were following 
an invisible rule of searching all persons arrested under similar 
circumstances, or whether this was an isolated incident reflecting a 
policy determination by the individual officer, as distinct from his 
superiors. 
There were not before us the elements essential to the exercise of 
sound judgment in the formulation of a legal rule of general appli-
cability. We would have been infinitely better equipped for that 
task if the police department, in proceedings analogous to general 
rule-making, had explored the considerations relevant to such a rule 
and had made a conscious and reasoned determination with respect 
to it. Without that, our own decisional processes were operating in 
a void of contending legal abstractions where the public interest 
could be seen but dimly, if at all. 
Legislatures, cognizant of their own limitations in respect of de-
tailed fact-gathering, specialized experience, and sluggish response to 
changing conditions, have turned increasingly to the administrative 
agency. If it be true, as Professor Goldstein has said, that even the 
legislatures' ability "to gather facts, to elicit public opinion, and to 
act in a manner which is subject to later adjustment" is overtaxed by 
"the infinite variety of complex situations which confront the police 
today,"56 how much more so is this the case in respect of the courts. 
It is important to emphasize at this point, however, that no re-
sponsible proponent of police rule-making is suggesting the abdica-
tion by either court or legislature of any role in scrutinizing its 
results. That would be an untenable position so long as we live under 
a constitutional framework of government. What is contemplated is 
that the police, in the classic tradition of administrative law, have a 
larger share in devising the rules for the governance of their own con-
duct in the first instance, with ultimate amenability to the commands 
of constitution and statute as interpreted and enforced by the courts 
in a reviewing stance. That, I believe, would represent a major im-
provement over the present situation as manifested in the case which 
I have just cited to you, in which our court was asked to be the rule 
maker of first instance in a field in which we had little expertise. 
Over and above the advantages which have been thought to exist 
in the administrative process in all contexts, there are considerations 
peculiar to the functioning of the police which argue for its merits 
in this narrower setting. The points of contact between the police 
and the citizen are of infinite variety. Many of them-indeed most-
56. Goldstein, supra note 8, at 1129, 1130. 
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are neither directed towards gathering evidence of specific crimes, nor 
do they eventuate in prosecutions. There is a wide range of police 
practices, with potentially severe impact upon the citizen, which 
never come to the notice of the courts.57 The promulgation of for-
mal rules relating to these operations offers the prospect of greater 
control of police activities presently unrestrained by external scru-
tiny. 
Moreover, with respect both to police activities which are pres-
ently unregulated by courts, and police activities which are presently 
regulated through the exclusionary rule, police rule-making offers 
the possibility of defining-really for the first time-the rights of sus-
pects. As Professor Amsterdam has observed, the exclusionary rule 
does not define the suspect's rights. It says, rather, that if a particu-
lar right is not respected, evidence thereafter accumulated may not 
be used at a trial. The Miranda rule does not say that a suspect in 
custody has a right to telephone a lawyer. It says only that, if he is 
not permitted to do so and a confession follows thereafter, that con-
fession is unavailing for purposes of his prosecution. But what about 
the suspect who never confesses but still would have liked to call his 
lawyer? So, concludes Professor Amsterdam, the formulation by the 
police of detailed rules for the treatment of suspects could well pro-
vide "what the courts have never been able to supply: comprehen-
sive and coherent definition of the rights of suspects, together with 
procedures for assuring that they are respected.''li8 
The point is not an unimportant one; and it is not too facilely 
to be assumed that the ·writing of rules by the police will inevitably 
be niggardly and regressive in the statement of positive rights. There 
is something about the very process of having to write down on paper 
detailed guidelines for one's conduct· which summons rationality 
and elevates principle. This is especially true if the process is highly 
visible and if the rule-maker is held accountable for the results; and 
police rule-making will serve the objectives of visibility and account-
ability. The making of policy by the single patrolman on the beat, 
of which Professor Davis so rightly complains, uo will be transferred 
to the highest echelons of leadership where it belongs. Certainly it 
is more likely that sensitivity to individual rights will be present in 
57. See Oaks, supra note 42, at 720. 
58. Amsterdam, supra note 8, at 812. 
59. The system is atrociously unsound under which an individual policeman has 
unguided discretionary power to weigh social values in an individual case and 
make a final decision as to governmental policy for that case, despite a statute to 
the contrary, without review by any other authority, without recording the facts 
he finds, without stating reasons, and without relating one case to another. 
K. DAVIS, supra note 6, at 88. 
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a process in which rules are visibly made by responsible police chiefs, 
aided by lawyers sensitive to the highest traditions of the profession, 
than in a process in which individual policemen are left to deal with 
suspects on their own. 
It is also possible that police rule-making will have immediate 
implications for the effective administration of discipline within the 
police departments. Internal sanctions for departures from norms of 
conduct depend upon precise and prior identification of what those 
norms are.60 And there should obviously be less reluctance by com-
mand authorities to punish infractions of rules formulated by those 
authorities themselves as compared with standards imposed from 
without. More effective departmental discipline, along with the trans-
fer of policy-making responsibilities to the upper levels of police 
leadership, should also contribute to the realization of a greater de-
gree of uniformity in law enforcement practices--a virtue which ap-
pears sadly lacking under a system where the differing values and 
judgments of individual police officers are uninhibited by official 
pronouncements of the policies to be observed. 
In the last analysis, it is the visibility of the administrative rule-
making process which is its greatest virtue. Without it, the police 
have never been compelled to recognize the degree to which their 
daily operations involve policy decisions of the greatest significance 
to the community. Nor have they been obliged to reach a conscious 
decision as to whether familiar ways of doing things, which appeal 
to them as effective, are compatible with overriding values generally 
comprehended within our concept of a government of laws.61 In its 
absence, there has not been the continuous re-examination of estab-
lished methods, the periodic probing to see if the desired objective 
can be achieved through new exercises of ingenuity and imagination 
without sacrifice of other social ends, which are the mark of the true 
profession. The extension of the administrative process to the police 
function would markedly advance the achievement of that status. 
It is appropriate, therefore, to tum to the questions of (1) the 
60. The Crime Commission Task Force Report describes the existing situation: 
Lacking a formulated policy and thus a preannounced basis for internal 
disci:plinary action, the police administrator is hesitant to impose sanctions upon -
the individual police officer who acts improperly but whose conduct does not 
violate departmental regulations . 
• • • The police administrator finds himself caught in a conflict between his desire 
to be responsive to a citizen who has reason to complain about a policeman's 
behavior and his fear of the reaction of his force to seemingly arbitrary discipline 
where there is no clear breach of a preannounced standard of proper conduct. 
TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE, supra note 8, at 20. See also Goldstein, Administrative 
Problems in Controlling the Exercise of Police Authority, 58 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 160, 
163 (1967). 
61. See TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE, supra note 8, at 17. 
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manner in which that process might be effectuated by the police, and 
(2) how its extension to them may be brought about. In respect of 
the former, there is no reason to think that a major police depart-
ment lacks the resources or the competence to engage in general 
rule-making, particularly if its organization includes a legal unit in 
the form of a General Counsel's office. The central question to be 
faced is the degree of participation in it by the public. 
It has been suggested that "[c]itizens' advisory committees could 
be consulted at the drafting stages," with final promulgation to be 
preceded by circulation of drafts for study and comment or for dis-
cussion at public hearings.62 That public participation through some 
such means would be useful seems obvious. It would add a demo-
cratic element to law enforcement which has long been absent; it 
would strike a new and healthy note of openness in what has char-
acteristically been a largely closed society; and it would cast the wid-
est possible net for new ideas. 63 
From the standpoint of the police themselves, there would ap-
pear to be benefits from the resulting greater public education in, 
and sympathetic understanding of, the many thorny problems in-
volved in law enforcement. Current ignorance of these problems is 
at the root of some of the more serious difficulties presently assailing 
the police, and any amelioration of it would be in the interest of the 
police as well as the public. In most areas of human experience, 
greater understanding is a necessary prelude to greater support, and 
law enforcement is presumably no exception to this precept. 
To my knowledge there is at least one major police department 
in the country where a form of rule-making is already in existence, 
and that department is in the District of Columbia. Some instruc-
tions to patrolmen in the area of criminal law and procedure are 
promulgated in the form of mandatory orders which are enforced 
through departmental discipline. Those issued thus far deal with 
such subjects as automobile searches and identification procedures. 
They are communicated to departmental personnel, and the famil-
iarity of the recipients with them is tested on promotional examina-
tions. If such an order is violated, disciplinary proceedings may be 
instituted, with the severity of the sanctions invoked geared to the 
circumstances of the violation. The sanctions range from official 
warnings and reprimands to trial board proceedings directed towards 
fines, suspensions, and discharges. 
The first drafts of such regulations are developed by the General 
Counsel, ordinarily after consultation with the operating divisions. 
62, Amsterdam, supra note 8, at 818. 
63. See K. DAVIS, supra note 6, at 92-93. 
March 1972] Rule-Making and the Police 683 
The first draft is customarily circulated on a personal and confiden-
tial basis to various knowledgeable people-prosecutors, defense 
counsel, law professors, police administrators, and the like. Subse-
quent drafts are prepared and circulated throughout the depart-
ment, with comments invited. A final draft is then submitted to the 
Chief of Police and, if approved, is issued in his name. There have 
been no public hearings, and the participation from outside the 
department has been limited as indicated. 
The process thus falls short, in the matter of public participation 
through notice and opportunity to be heard, of what would have 
been provided in that regard in normal administrative agency rule-
making. But the resulting regulations do, in two significant ways, go 
beyond what has been described as the typical legal advisor opera-
tion. 64 One is that the operational instructions are made obligatory, 
and the other is that they have manifested an apparent willingness to 
address problems in advance of judicial or legislative mandates, as in 
the case concerning pre-trial identification which I mentioned yester-
day. 65 For a voluntary system, these innovations are not inconsider-
able; and the courts, at the least, are provided the reference point of 
a careful and detailed articulation of policy by the police as to how 
field operations are to be carried on. 
The District of Columbia example is relevant to the second ques-
tion posed above, namely, the means by which the rule-making pro-
cess is to be extended to the police. It indicates that there are no 
apparent impediments to a voluntary undertaking by the police to 
proceed by rule-making in the agency tradition. It does not estab-
lish, in and of itself, that there is any likelihood that other police 
departments will emulate that example. Professor Davis has voiced 
pessimism on this score, and his doubts, in what he refers to as "the 
present climate of opinion," extend to the imminence of legislative 
action to place the police in the administrative agency mould by 
subjecting them to statutes comparable to the federal Administra-
tive Procedure Act.66 If his forebodings are plausible, as they well 
may be, it is pertinent to inquire what powers the courts may have 
to bring about this seemingly desirable result. 
There is, of course, always the possibility that judicial expressions 
like that of the Supreme Court in Wade, suggesting that police regu-
lations are an alternative to rules fashioned by the courts even in the 
constitutional sphere, may eventually bear fruit. They offer the po-
lice an escape from the constitutional straitjacket, and provide an in-
64. E.g., Jorgenson 8c Levine, The Police Legal Advisor, 45 FLA. B.J. 66 (1971). 
65. See text following note 8 supra. 
66. K. DAVIS, supra note 6, at 95. 
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centive for self-regulation as opposed to the imposition of rules from 
without by less expert and experienced sources. It is hard to see why 
this avenue is not an inviting one, but it may be that it takes un-
usually broad-gauged police leadership to discern its merits and to 
make the requisite effort. It is easier to go on complaining about 
judicial interference to a public largely unaware that the courts 
themselves have suggested this means of deliverance. 67 
There remains the interesting, albeit presently unresolvable, 
question of whether the judicial power could be exerted to compel 
the police to proceed by rule-making. Any argument to that end 
would presumably begin by recognizing the formidable nature of 
the impact which the police can and do have on the lives of their 
fellow citizens. With a virtual monopoly of force and the authority 
to use it when needed, it is perhaps not far-fetched to assert, as Pro-
fessor Amsterdam has, that such extraordinary powers should always 
be under the aegis of visible rules for their exercise, and that the 
failure of the police to impose this restraint upon themselves, at least 
in respect of individual rights guaranteed by the Constitution, would 
in itself raise due process problems. 68 
That particular constitutional concept has long embraced a re-
quirement that agencies which have rules must observe them. In a 
recent application of this principle, the Fourth Circuit reversed a 
conviction for this reason, saying that it was of no significance that 
the agency procedures violated were "more generous than the Con-
stitution requires."69 It quoted with approval an observation of the 
Second Circuit that departures from agency rules" 'cannot be recon-
ciled with the fundamental principle that ours is a government of 
laws, not men' ";70 and it emphasized that, in the case before it, the 
agency had expressly justified the rules in question as ensuring "uni-
formity" in the protection of personal rights. 
If a court is warranted in insisting that, in order to have a gov-
67. If the maximum benefits are to be obtained from police rule-making, of course, 
the system should not be conceived solely as a means of escaping the constitutional 
straitjacket. Ideally, the rule makers should not attempt merely to define the consti-
tutionally permissible boundaries of police action, but should rather weigh competing 
interests and policies and, when appropriate, write rules which restrict police conduct 
more stringently than would the Constitution alone. 
68. Due process of law comports the command that public agencies-particularly 
an agency such as the police, which possesses broad and virtually monopolistic 
powers to use force and restraint upon the citizenry-act according to uniform, 
visible and regular rules of law. When the extraordinary powers of the police arc 
used unconstrainedly-that is, in the absence of such rules-they arc used arbitrarily 
in a constitutional sense, in violation of due process. Such rule-less police actions 
may also violate standards established by state law for all administrative action, 
Amsterdam, supra note 8, at 814 (footnote omitted), 
69. United States v. Heffner, 420 F.2d 809, 812 (4th Cir. 1970), 
70. 420 F.2d at 812, quoting Hammand v. Lenfest, 398 F.2d 705, 715 (2d Cir, 1968), 
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emment of laws, an agency rigorously adhere to the rules it has, it 
may not be too long a step to regard an agency operating without 
rules as in a lawless posture. The Fourth Circuit has moved in this 
direction in a case involving prison administration, saying: 
Courts are not called upon and have no desire to lay down de-
tailed codes for the conduct of penal institutions, state or federal .... 
[But] [w]here the lack of effective supervisory procedures exposes 
men to the capricious imposition of added punishment, due process 
and Eighth Amendment questions inevitably arise.71 
And there are cases where the trial courts, confronted with substan-
tial violations by the police of civil rights, have commanded the po-
lice to draw up written plans and instructions governing the conduct 
of members of the force.72 
These last are instances of ad hoc directions by the courts to the 
police to make rules, and they have occurred in the context of wide-
spread actual violation of individual rights of constitutional magni-
tude. They are, admittedly, a far cry from the exercise of judicial 
power to require the making of rules in advance of such violations 
or which embody self-denying restraints not constitutionally com-
pelled. But they stress the importance to the liberties of the citizen 
of there being precise police rules in existence. As recognition of 
that importance widens, which it appears to be presently doing, it 
would be premature to predict that they will never be perceived by 
the courts as an imperative of due process or as an assurance that 
the public is receiving the uniformity of treatment at the hands of 
the police inherent in the concept of equal protection.73 
If the administrative model should prevail in respect of police 
operations, and general rule-making come to be a familiar element 
in the police scene, consideration must be given to the role of the 
courts in that scheme of things. It is obvious that the mere fact of 
rule-making is no guarantee that the rules made will in all respects 
be consonant with constitutional or statutory standards.74 Neither 
71. Landman v. Peyton, 370 F.2d 135, 141 (4th Cir. 1966). 
72. See, e.g., Hicks v. Knight, IO RACE REL. L. REP. 1504 (E.D. La. 1965), in which 
a city commissioner of public safety and a chief of police were ordered, under penalty 
of contempt, to adopt and publish a plan for police coverage of picketing and demon-
strations in the city. In conjunction with this, they were directed to "[d]evelop and 
adopt in writing a set of specific instructions as to the duties of individual police officers 
and police supervisors in executing the plan," and to "[a]dopt in writing a plan for 
instituting disciplinary action against any police officer of the City ••• who refused 
••• to know and perform ••• [his] assignment under the plan." IO RACE REL. L. REP. 
at 1507-08. See also Cunningham v. Grenada School Dist., 11 RACE REL. L. REP. 1776 
(N.D. Miss. 1966); Note, The Federal Injunction as a Remedy for Unconstitutional 
Police Conduct, 78 YALE LJ. 143 (1968). 
73. See Comment, Equal Protection as a Defense to Selective Law Enforcement by 
Police Officials, 14 J. PUB. L. 223 (1965). 
74. It would, of course, be desirable for courts to be able to review police regnlations 
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does the existence of valid rules mean that they will never be ignored 
or violated. The courts remain to make such determinations and to 
prescribe their consequences. They continue to be, as before, the 
ultimate shield of the citizen from the improper actions of his gov-
ernment. The relevant inquiry is as to the reconstruction of the role 
of the courts so that they can more effectively review police conduct 
by reference to rationally conceived prior rules, as distinct from 
formulating such rules in the first instance. 
A first question in this regard has to do with the timing of the 
review. May police rules, upon promulgation, be judicially examined 
before they are implemented, or will the inquiry into validity come 
only upon challenge by a particular criminal defendant in the course 
of his prosecution? The former course has increasingly become a 
characteristic of general administrative law, and would appear to 
have significant advantages in respect of police rule-making.7G 
There is, first, the desirability, in these times of congested dockets, 
of reducing the number of individual criminal appeals as much as 
possible. If a police practice embodied in a general rule withstands 
scrutiny by the courts promptly after issuance, defense attorneys will 
have no basis for filing repeated criminal appeals incorporating the 
same challenge. A second advantage is that pre-implementation re-
view would enable the courts to examine a broader range of police 
practices. This includes those which do not normally produce evi-
dence and which do not, therefore, come to light in a criminal trial. 
These very practices may, however, have substantial impact upon 
rights of privacy and the inherent dignity of the individual. 
A third consideration emerges from what has been described as 
a weakness of the present system of judicial review, namely, that it 
represents "a decision about the propriety of the actions of the in-
dividual officer rather than a review of departmental administrative 
policy."76 Pre-implementation review would shift the focus from in-
with respect to statutory, as well as constitutional, standards. Statutory standards, 
which exist with respect to virtually every other administrative agency, both democratize 
control of administrative action and make control more effective, by providing greater 
specificity than is found in the Constitution. In light of the common characterization 
of the police function as "executive," rather than "legislative," the absence of statutory 
standards may not give rise to delegation problems. But it is certainly true that provi-
sion of guiding standards for law enforcement would be a worthwhile subject for legis-
lative activity; and a system of police rule-making, by casting the police in the light of 
the administrative model, might provide an impetus in that direction. 
75. As is commonly the case with other administrative agencies, the sequence might 
be: (1) rule-making proceedings, followed by (2) judicial review of the proposed rules, 
upon proper petition by interested parties, followed by (3) implementation of the rules, 
to the extent that they are approved by the courts. The first step, it should be noted, 
refers to final agency action; it may, of course, be desirable to have an administrative 
review procedure within police departments. 
76. TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE, supra note 8, at 31. 
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dividual derelictions to department-wide policies; and surely it is the 
latter which is the more vital concern of the courts.77 It is also true 
that a first essential of adequate administration of discipline within 
the police department is the early establishment of the illegality of 
the conduct sought to be punished. If there are clear definitions of 
proper police conduct which have successfully survived challenge in 
the courts, the police administrator is immeasurably strengthened in 
his capacity to secure adherence to those definitions by the prospect 
of departmental discipline.78 
Lastly, improper police activity is, even apart from conviction of 
crime, frequently irreparable in a literal sense. It entails limitations 
upon freedom of movement and invasions of privacy for which there 
are virtually no means of redress. Thus it is important that rules li-
able to such defects be examined as quickly as possible and their 
implementation prevented. Pre-implementation review would serve 
this interest to a degree necessarily wanting in piecemeal challenges 
by individual defendants. 
Indeed, it would appear that the availability of pre-implementa-
tion review is important if, in the matter of sanctions, police rule-
making is to offer a possible alternative to the exclusionary rule. If 
objections may only be made in individual prosecutions, the judge 
77. Although police administrators might be expected effectively to discipline their 
subordinates, it is less likely that they can objectively review department-wide official 
policy. As Professor Goldstein has written, supra note 60, at 164: 
Existing control mechanisms, designed as they are to control individual behavior, 
cannot adequately perform the quite different and more complex task of exposing 
and reviewing enforcement policies and practices .••• However strongly committed 
an agency may be to disciplining the conduct of its employees, it is not likely to 
criticize the actions of an officer which, though of questionable legality, are in 
accord with a practice knowingly and consciously engaged in by the agency. 
This suggests that department-wide policies, as distinct from the individual conduct 
of police officers, can be adeqµately controlled only from outside a police depart-
ment. 
78. Under the present system, a police administrator who is confronted with action 
of dubious propriety by a subordinate often does not know whether the conduct is 
legal, and cannot know until after a defendant challenges the action in his trial. This 
fact may hinder effective departmental discipline in two respects. First, the administra-
tor may be reluctant to appear to his men to be restraining them in the absence of 
any "need" to do so, i.e., the conduct may be perfectly legal. And, second, if the 
administrator believes that the conduct is effective in apprehending lawbreakers, he 
may want to allow his men to continue to act accordingly, in the hope that a court 
will eventually give its approval. 
If, however, there is a clear definition of the boundary of proper police conduct 
in the form of a police regulation to which a court has given its approval prior to 
implementation, the administrator might not be so hesitant to institute disciplinary 
proceedings. So long as a clear standard of conduct has been breached, his men could 
not question the propriety of punishment. And, even if he regarded the conduct as 
effective, there would be no reason to avoid disciplining the offender. If he believed 
that such conduct should be permitted in the future, his proper course would be to 
reopen rule-making proceedings and present to a reviewing court a proposed regulation 
which authorized the conduct. Punishment of the officer for breach of the prior rule 
would be neither inconsistent with the subsequent rule-making proceedings, nor "pre-
judicial" to the administrator's case in court when the revised regulation is reviewed. 
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must impose the only sanction he has-exclusion of evidence-if 
there is to be any incentive to identify and attack questionable rules. 
Thus, pre-implementation review may not only decrease the inci-
dence of unlawful infringement of citizens' rights by the police, but 
also advance the public interest in convicting the guilty. 
The virtues of pre-implementation review of the product of po-
lice rule-making are plainly evident. What is not perhaps so clear is 
the question of judicial power to grant such review at the instance of 
a party who has not yet become the object of the rules he seeks to 
attack. The issues are the familiar ones of standing and ripeness, 
with the latter being of predominant concem.79 
In the federal judicial system, the case-or-controversy require-
ment of the Constitution might seem to interpose a barrier. But the 
shadow of United Public Workers v. Mitchell80 is arguably not so 
long as it once was, particularly in the context of state, as opposed to 
federal, action.81 And the patent interest of the courts themselves in 
having the aid of police-made rules as guides to decision in the quick-
sands of the criminal field would undoubtedly find expression in a 
willingness to go to the outermost limits of judicial ingenuity in 
finding jurisdiction to review. 
The critical issue with respect to police rule-making, as it is for 
rules made for the police by courts and legislatures, is that of the 
79. An argument to the effect that there is not sufficient personal interest (standing) 
on which to ground jurisdiction in the case of pre-implementation review of proposed 
police regulations would center on the fact that events would not have matured 
(ripened) sufficiently so that it could be determined exactly which persons will be 
adversely affected. Standing and ripeness would, in other words, be the same issue; the 
former would be subsumed by the latter. 
80. 330 U.S. 75 (1947). See also International Longshoremen v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222 
(1954). Mitchell concerned the petition of several federal employees for a declaratory 
judgment that the Hatch Act prohibition against political campaigning could not be 
applied to them consistently with the first amendment. The Supreme Court held that 
the petitioners' mere allegations of intent to perform various acts apparently within 
the statute's prohibitions did not create a case or controversy. 
81. See Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952); Note, The Supreme Court, 1951 
Term, 66 HARV. L. REV. 89, 121 (1952); III K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 
§ 21.06 (1958). Furthermore, even if Mitchell is assumed to be viable precedent, it would 
appear not to bar pre-implementation review of police regulations covering a wide range 
of police practices. Mitchell cannot be read as holding that there is no case or contro• 
versy until sanctions are actually applied against an individual, since such a reading 
would abolish declaratory judgments. Rather, a petitioner under Mitchell may some• 
times have to put himself within the scope of a statute or regulation, so that il 
authorizes sanctions to be applied to him, before his challenge to the statute or 
regulation can amount to a case or controversy. Under that interpretation of Mitchell, 
regulations covering a wide range of police practices would be reviewable at the pre• 
implementation stage, namely, those regulations covering police conduct subsequent 
to arrest or indictment. After a suspect has been arrested or indicted (whichever occurs 
first), he is in a position in which the police are authorized to act against his personal 
interests, just as the Civil Service Commission might have been authorized to act against 
the personal interests of the employees in Mitchell if they had in fact performed the 
acts which they alleged an intent to perform. 
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sanction for violation. If exclusion of reliable evidence attributable 
to the violation is to remain, then the police may well resist rule-
making as likely to be a trap of their own contriving. They would, 
assuming the duty of rule-making is thrust upon them, at the least 
be tempted to keep their rules closely confined within minimum 
constitutional requirements, as distinct from placing limitations 
upon themselves not commanded by court or legislature. If police 
rule-making is to realize the maximum potential benefits, however, 
it should not be limited to what the courts have prescribed as mini-
mum constitutional requirements. Constitutions do not embody all 
of the identifiable principles of action making for the greatest degree 
of fairness to the suspect or the most reasonable assurance that the 
guilty will be convicted. There is a wide range of procedural al-
ternatives below the constitutional level which can contribute to 
these ends. 
The future of police rule-making is, theµ, intimately interwoven 
with the future of the exclusionary rule. It is therefore essential to 
inquire as to the possible effect of a system of formal rules, made 
and enforced by the police, on the exclusionary rule, and as to 
whether there is a distinction, in that connection, between violations 
of constitutional requirements, on the one hand, and, on the other, 
violations of regulations founded upon considerations not dictated 
by constitutional commands. 
In the former case-violations of constitutional requirements, 
whether or not embodied in regulations-there is room for: argument 
as to whether the exclusionary rule, as it has thus far been conceived, 
represents an immutable constitutional requirement in the sense 
that there is a personal constitutional right never to be convicted 
by means of evidence acquired under certain conditions. Conversely, 
it may be looked upon as a flexible device which, at its inception, is 
justified as the only foreseeable means of preserving certain consti-
tutional values, and one which loses its imperative character if al-
ternative means of providing that protection come into being. In the 
identification cases,82 the Supreme Court in terms contemplated the 
latter approach. In other applications, its language has been cast in 
a more rigid mould. The effect of police rule-making on presently 
existing exclusionary rules, in short, will depend upon the purposes 
of the exclusionary sanction, and the potential of police rule-making 
as an alternative means for achieving them. 
If the exclusionary rule has no legal foundation in anything other 
than the purpose of the courts to deter future violations of the gov-
erning rules, then perhaps the matter could be resolved quite simply. 
82. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 239 (1967). 
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The judges might say in effect to the police: If you can satisfy us 
that you are doing everything you can to reduce the incidence of 
violations through meaningful disciplinary action, we will no longer 
need to seek deterrence through the indirect sanction of exclusion.83 
This would be a sensible approach, since direct discipline imposed 
by the police internally is far more likely to deter than remote ex-
clusions of evidence in criminal trials. Whether it is an available 
one, however, depends on the accuracy of the underlying premise 
that the exclusionary rule is rooted in nothing more than a deterrent 
purpose. That is a proposition which, in the current state of the 
cases, does not lend itself comfortably to dogmatic assertion. 
The answer, of course, may lie in the concept that there is not 
one exclusionary rule but several, depending upon the precise na-
ture of the constitutional provision being immediately implemented. 
A look at the fourth and fifth amendments is instructive in this re-
gard. The former is addressed to the act of search and seizure, and 
is formulated in language suggesting preoccupation with the values 
of privacy, which are damaged by the unreasonable intrusion even 
though the resulting evidence, if any, is never used. It may be argued, 
accordingly, that the exclusionary rule emanating from the fourth 
amendment is not a personal right to the exclusion of evidence but 
is, rather, a means of regulating official conduct at the time when it 
occurs. The fifth amendment, on the other hand, is addressed to the 
compulsion of testimony; and its focus is upon the use in judicial 
proceedings of evidence amounting to such compulsion. It may be, 
therefore, that the existence of alternative means of deterring the 
conduct giving rise to the evidence does not dissipate the necessity 
of keeping out of the trial evidence which in itself puts the defend-
ant in the position of supplying proof against himself.84 
Justice Black came close to making this distinction when, in a 
recent case, he said that the fifth amendment "directly and explic-
itly commands its own exclusionary rule."85 He was unable to glean 
such a command from the language of the fourth amendment, al-
though he has been prepared to assume a closer conjunction between 
the two amendments for exclusionary purposes than has been visi-
83. It would be a difficult question as to the point at which police department 
discipline was sufficiently effective so that the deterrent rationale for the exclusionary 
rule could be cast aside. Regulations are not self-enforcing, and the problems of 
discipline in police departments cannot be minimized. See Goldstein, supra note 60, 
at 166-67. The burden would be on the police officials to show that their efforts provided 
a viable deterrent threat. 
84-. See Dershowitz &: Ely, Harris v. New York: Some Anxious Observations on the 
Candor and Logic of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198, 1214 (19'71). 
85. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 498 (1971) (concurring opinion). 
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ble to other members of the Court.86 This conjunction is not 
self-evident, however, since it would appear that the ban on self-in-
crimination may be operative without reference to the question of 
whether the evidence was come by through either legal or illegal 
means. 
In any event, it may be true that police regulations resting upon 
the fifth amendment must inevitably invoke the exclusionary sanc-
tion, whereas violations of those geared to the fourth need not in-
variably do so. And it is the use of the exclusionary rule in the search 
and seizure field which currently is presenting the courts with the 
most difficult and pressing problems, not only of reasoned applica-
tion but also of public dissatisfaction, since it often results in the ex-
clusion of concededly reliable and, indeed, conclusive evidence of 
guilt. Thus it is pertinent to pursue the question of whether the exis-
tence of police regulations relating to search and seizure, accompanied 
by rigorous departmental discipline for individual violations, would 
admit of the relaxation of the exclusionary rule in this area. 
In Mapp the Supreme Court articulated as the policy bases of the 
exclusionary rule, first and primarily, the deterrence of improper 
law enforcement activity, and, second, the imperative of judicial in-
tegrity, by which was meant the unseemliness of the countenancing 
by courts of improper police conduct. If it be assumed that police 
self-regulation will provide a more effective means of achieving de-
terrence, how far does the second policy stand as a legal barrier to 
the abandonment of the exclusionary rule? 
Professor Oaks would say, not at all. He argues that the Supreme 
Court has on many occasions upheld convictions originating in un-
lawful police conduct.87 Mainly, however, he relies upon the Court's 
decision in Linkletter v. Walker88 not to make retroactive the Mapp 
extension of the fourth amendment exclusionary rule to the states. 
While the majority in that case did state that deterrence of illegal 
police conduct was the "prime purpose" of the fourth amendment 
exclusionary rule, it is not clear that the opinion precludes the pos-
sibility that there are other important purposes behind the rule, or 
that its necessary implication is that the exclusionary rule would be 
abolished if the deterrent function were accomplished through other 
means. 
First, Linkletter made the exclusionary rule operative in cases 
not finally disposed of when Mapp was decided, even though the 
questioned police conduct occurred prior to Mapp, rendering the 
86. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 661-62 (1961) (concurring opinion). 
87. Oaks, supra note 42, at 669. 
88. 381 U.S. 618 (1965). 
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deterrent rationale inapplicable. Second, and more significant, is the 
manner in which the Court proceeded in Linkletter after it stated 
that retroactive application would not advance the deterrent purpose 
of the Mapp rule. The Court did not end the discussion at that 
point, as it might have if deterrence were the only purpose behind 
the exclusionary rule. Rather, the Court undertook what Justice 
Black, in dissent, characterized as a balancing process, in which such 
policy factors as the disruption of federal-state relations, the whole-
sale release of guilty persons, and the burden placed on the federal 
courts of trying to determine stale factual issues (with dubious results 
in terms of justice either to the accused or the state), loomed larger 
than the more intangible imperative of judicial integrity. 
What Linkletter does appear to establish is that, at least when the 
cornerstone of deterrence is removed, the fourth amendment exclu-
sionary rule does not rest upon an unshakeable foundation. The 
policy arguments for its employment are subject to being overcome 
by countervailing policy arguments for its rejection. The interesting 
speculation for present purposes is as to what the nature of those 
clashing policy considerations will be seen to be in the matrix of a 
thoroughgoing system of police self-regulation. 
The "imperative of judicial integrity" has commonly been said 
to flow from the ideas that public respect for the courts will be eroded 
if they entertain evidence which has been acquired through police 
derelictions, and that the reception of such evidence in the judicial 
process operates to "legitimize" illegal conduct. The measurement of 
the public temper at any one point in time is an inexact process at 
best, and one for which the Supreme Court is perhaps not peculiarly 
qualified. To assert that public disrespect is the consequence of 
failing to exclude othenvise reliable evidence is not to prove the 
existence of that state of mind. The contrary assertion, namely, that 
the rejection of such evidence creates public disrespect for the courts 
may be equally plausible, albeit equally difficult to establish as the 
majority bent of public opinion. The truth may be that the prevail-
ing balance on this score fluctuates from time to time, in the manner 
of the standing of a presidential hopeful, and that no op.e can be 
other than tentative in pronouncing judgment on such a matter. 
What does seem clear is that so ethereal a concept as the "impera-
tive of judicial integrity" does not, without more, mandate either 
admission or exclusion of reliable evidence improperly come by. The 
application of the exclusionary sanction is determined by a weighing 
of constitutionally cognizable interests. How far the factor of judicial 
integrity enters into this balance of competing values would appear to 
depend upon its correspondence, in Justice Holmes's phrase, "with 
March 1972] Rule-Making and the Police 693 
the actual feelings and demands of the community, right or wrong." 
The assumption upon which this discussion proceeds is, of course, 
that there are in existence rules made by the police which are to be 
observed by them. A deviation from those rules brings into play 
another legal principle of constitutional significance which may or 
may not be decisive in respect of the exclusionary rule. Its operation 
can be illustrated by the 1969 decision of the Fourth Circuit referred 
to above.89 There a conviction for tax fraud was reversed because an 
Internal Revenue Service agent violated the Service's established 
procedure in criminal investigations by failing to inform the defend-
ant of the purpose of the interview and of his right to retain counsel. 
Without deciding that such a procedure had to be followed in the 
absence of an agency directive on the subject, and, indeed, assuming 
the contrary to be the case, the court concluded that the directive, 
once in being, had to be followed. 
In reaching this disposition, the Fourth Circuit was well within 
the boundaries of settled Supreme Court doctrine, marked out in 
many cases. A leading one in the series is United States ex rel. Accardi 
v. Shaughnessy,90 in which an admittedly deportable alien attacked 
the validity of his deportation order on the ground that, prior to the 
consideration of his application to the Board of Immigration Appeals 
for suspension of the order, the Attorney General had issued a list of 
"unsavory characters" upon which his name appeared. Departmental 
regulations provided that the Board was to exercise its discretion 
over applications for suspension, with ultimate review by the At-
torney General. The Court held that, even though the Attorney 
General had the last word and there was no legal necessity to provide 
for intermediate action by the Board, "as long as the regulations 
remain operative, the Attorney General denies himself the right to 
sidestep the Board or dictate its decision."91 Consequently, it voided 
the deportation order. 
This so-called Accardi doctrine reflects a recurring theme that 
actions by an agency in violation of its own regulations are to be 
given no effect when the personal interests of those subject to agency 
action are adversely affected-and this is true whether or not the 
action in question would have been proper in default of a regulation 
on the subject.92 The rationale derives from the principle, underlying 
the concept of due process, that individual interests are to be pro-
89. United States v. Heffner, 420 F.2d 809 (4th Cir. 1970). See text accompanying 
notes 69-70 supra. 
90. 347 U.S. 260 (1954). 
91. 347 U.S. at 267. 
92. See Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959); Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957); 
Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945); Hammond v. Lenfest, 398 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1968). 
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tected against governmental action which contravenes express and 
visible limitations upon governmental power, even when those limi-
tations are self-imposed and not contemplated by constitution or 
statute. 
The relevance of this principle to police regulations is readily 
apparent. It represents a constitutionally cognizable value which, 
although not itself determinative of the question of whether evidence 
gathered in defiance of a police rule should be excluded, presumably 
would enter into the balancing process by which that question is to 
be answered. And it is to be noted that this would be true irrespective 
of whether the rule involved constitutional requirements, or only 
those of lesser degree which the police had thought it in the public 
interest to assume. 
The Accardi principle has been formulated in a federal context, 
and it may possibly have less significance in a state situation. But 
the principle it implements is one which cannot be left wholly out of 
account in thinking about the role of the exclusionary sanction in 
cases involving evidence having its source in police disregard of their 
own rules. The disappearance of the deterrent element, and the dis-
counting of the "imperative of judicial integrity," still leave it as a 
point to be reckoned with. 
The values on the other side of the ledger are plain to see. Al-
though we are alert to separate the innocent from the guilty, we do 
not think the latter should escape the consequences of their acts in 
defiance of the social order. Easy escape from criminal consequences 
threatens the stability of any society, and usually inflicts the greatest 
injury on those least able to insulate themselves from the conditions 
in which crime thrives. We think prevention is better than punish-
ment, but we have not yet attained a state of sophistication where the 
latter can, with safety either to our physical or moral security, be 
dispensed with. At the same time, we believe that obedience to the 
law is indivisible, and we reject a double standard for private citizen 
and public official. There are consequences to be attached to viola-
tions by each, and the lawless enforcement of law is utterly alien to 
the premises of our legal system. 
The reconciliation of these contending claims is always difficult-
and no more so than in the matter of the exclusionary rule. The judge 
wrestling with these issues is left very much at large, and sees clearly 
only the diverging policy factors in the scale before him. At all events, 
a new factor will appear in that balance if the police take on the 
character of a professional, disciplined, and informed agency, order-
ing their operations by visible and uniform rules formulated with the 
aid of broad community participation. 
